











































We quantify the importance of precautionary labor supply using data from the German Socio-
Economic Panel (SOEP) for 2001-2012. We estimate dynamic labor supply equations augmented
with a measure of wage risk. Our results show that married men choose about 2.5% of their hours
of work or one week per year on average to shield against unpredictable wage shocks. This implies
that about 26% of precautionary savings are due to precautionary labor supply. If self-employed
faced the same wage risk as the median civil servant, their hours of work would reduce by 4%.
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1 Introduction
This study quantifies the importance of precautionary labor supply, defined as the difference be-
tween hours supplied in the presence of risk and hours under perfect foresight. Our findings show
that married men choose about 2.5% of their hours of work or one week per year on average to
shield against unpredictable wage shocks. This is an important part of the overall precautionary
savings workers can accumulate by cutting consumption (see, e.g., Dynan 1993; Gourinchas and
Parker 2002; Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln and Schu¨ndeln 2005) or working longer hours (Carroll and Kim-
ball 2008). The current evidence for the importance of overall precautionary saving is mixed, but
most studies find that income risk drives households to hold about 20-50% of wealth as a precau-
tion (see, e.g., Carroll and Samwick 1998). In this study, we quantify the importance of wage risk,
that is, the standard deviation of past hourly individual wages, for hours of work and examine how
many additional hours of work result from the precautionary motive. This motive may exist if in-
dividuals consider their expectations about future wage shocks when deciding how much to work
in a given period (Low 2005). Individuals with higher risk, for instance, the self-employed, would
work more hours than those facing lower risks, even before shocks are realized to accumulate
precautionary wealth.
Quantifying the relevance of precautionary labor supply is important, from both a theoretical
and a policy perspective. Our contribution empirically corroborates the relevance of precautionary
labor supply predicted in theoretical studies and provides parameters that rationalize this behavior.
From a policy perspective, our study contributes to a better understanding of the effects of social
security. Engen and Gruber (2001) showed that the social security system crowds out precautionary
savings. Our study shows that this channel reduces the precautionary part of labor supply and
quantifies this effect.
Some theoretical studies suggest that precautionary labor supply is important. Flode´n (2006)
demonstrates that higher wage risk increases first period labor supply in a two-period model with
endogenous savings. Eaton and Rosen (1980) show that wage uncertainty increases labor supply
under sufficiently high risk aversion. Pijoan-Mas (2006) shows that 15.2% of work hours are due
to lack of insurance in an incomplete markets economy through a calibration exercise. However,
this result is not directly comparable to Flode´n’s concept of precautionary labor supply, where
individuals use additional hours of work to increase savings as an insurance device before the
realization of wage risk. In this study, we focus on the latter concept of precautionary labor supply,
that is, adjustments in work hours to address anticipated, but not yet realized, risks.
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There is very little empirical research devoted to this issue, and the scarce evidence is mixed.
Pistaferri (2003) finds that the effect of wage risk on labor supply agrees with the theory, but is
negligible in practice. In contrast, Parker et al. (2005) show that the self-employed respond to
greater earnings risk by working longer hours. Kuhn and Lozano (2008) find that work hours
are longer in jobs with higher wage inequality, which could be evidence of precautionary labor
supply. Recently, a vibrant debate was sparked by the paradox of toil (Eggertsson 2010), i.e. the
observation that in recessions people work less even though they want to provide a few more hours
a week due to the precautionary motive (Mulligan 2010; Eggertsson and Krugman 2012).
Our study contributes to this literature as the first to empirically quantify the amount of hours
worked due to the precautionary motive. We connect insights on intertemporal labor supply choices
from the seminal studies of Heckman and Macurdy (1980), MaCurdy (1981), and Blundell and
Walker (1986)1 with the literature on the importance of precautionary saving (e.g., Guiso et al.
1992; Dynan 1993; Carroll and Samwick 1997, 1998; Lusardi 1998; Gourinchas and Parker 2002;
Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln and Schu¨ndeln 2005; Fossen and Rostam-Afschar 2013).
We estimate the impact of wage risk on hours of work using German SOEP data for 2001
to 2012. Following Altonji (1986) and MaCurdy (1981), we focus our analysis on married men.
Our measure for idiosyncratic wage risk is based on the variability of previous wage realizations,
similar to Parker et al. (2005). To overcome potential endogeneity issues, we instrument wages and
risk measures with lags and lagged labor income. Thus, our results provide causal evidence. To
separate wage risk from other determinants of labor supply, we control for a rich set of variables
including unemployment probability calculated similar to Carroll et al. (2003), as the predicted
probability not to work in the next period. Since it might be difficult to adjust hours to their desired
level instantaneously, we specify dynamic labor supply regressions to capture partial adjustment.
We find that workers choose about 2.5% of their hours of work or one week per year to shield
against unpredictable wage shocks. This effect is economically important. Considering a person
who works 42 hours per week, precautionary labor supply amounts to about one week per year or
in monetary terms, about 710 Euro per year, with a typical net wage rate of 13 Euro. If the self-
employed faced the same wage risk as the median civil servant, their hours of work would drop by
4%. Our findings suggest that unemployment probability also plays a statistically significant role,
but is quantitatively less important than wage risk.
To test whether our finding can indeed be interpreted as precautionary labor supply, we run
1See Card (1994) and Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) for a survey.
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wealth regressions and replicate results from the literature on the size of precautionary savings.
Assuming that half of these savings are precautionary, about one fourth results from precaution-
ary labor supply and the rest from foregone consumption. In a two-period calibration exercise
using our estimate for the Frisch labor elasticity (about 20%), we show that these results may be
replicated with parameters that are in line with the literature.
The next section derives the empirical specification. Section 3 describes the construction of key
variables, the data, and the empirical strategy. Section 4 presents the estimates and the implications
of the dynamic labor supply equations as well as a brief investigation of precautionary savings, and
Section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical Considerations












where ct and ht denote the choice of consumption and hours of work, respectively, in period t. ρ
denotes a discount factor and u an instantaneous utility function.
The choices are constrained by the asset accumulation rule
at+1 = (1+ rt)(at +w
g
t ht +nt− ct−Mt),
where at represents assets, rt the real interest rate, nt non-labor income, and Mt tax liability, which
depends on gross income and household characteristics. The gross wage rate wgt is stochastic.








, ϑ < 0,γ ≥ 0,
with bt = exp(φ∆Ξit +υit). Ξit is a set of personal characteristics that modify tastes for work
and υit is an idiosyncratic disturbance. Approximating the standard Euler equation and substituting




∆ lnwit− 1γ ρ(1+ rt)−
1
γ
lnbit + eit , (1)
where wit is the real marginal after-tax wage rate of consumer i at age t. 1/γ is the Frisch labor
elasticity and the approximation error eit is a function of wage risk (see Low 2005; Domeij and
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Flode´n 2006).2 This yields the estimation equation
∆ lnhit = β˜1∆ lnwit + β˜2∆Xit +uit , (2)
where Xit contains Ξit as well as a constant and year dummies that capture the second term
on the right hand side in equation (1). In the empirical specification, Xit includes dummies for
children of three age groups (younger than three, between three and five, or between six and 18) in
the household, year dummies, years of education, tenure, a dummy for East Germany, age, and age
squared in addition to a measure for unemployment probability Pr u,it (see Subsection 3.2). The
error term uit contains eit and a measure of wage risk, which we proxy with the term σw,it . Wage
risk is measured as the within standard deviation of the idiosyncratic log wages from the previous
five years (see Subsection 3.1. With these terms, the augmented labor supply equation is
∆ lnhit = β˜1∆ lnwit + β˜2∆Xit + β˜3∆σw,it +ξit , (3)
where ξit is the redefined residual of the approximation.
The immediate adjustment labor supply equation is misspecified if individuals cannot adjust
their hours of work immediately, for example, because hours of work are negotiated centrally for
many occupations in Germany or because of the ”paradox of toil” (Eggertsson 2010). To allow for
this possibility, we specify a partial adjustment model. Denote the desired labor supply by lnh∗it :
lnh∗it = β˜1 lnwit + β˜2Xit + β˜3σw,it + vit , (4)
where vit is an error term. A simple partial adjustment mechanism employed by, for example,
Robins and West (1980), Euwals (2005), and Baltagi et al. (2005), is given by
lnhit− lnhit−1 = θ(lnh∗it− lnhit−1), 0 < θ < 1. (5)
θ may be interpreted as the speed of adjustment. This speed might be determined by costs to
immediately adjust the labor supply to desired hours or habit persistence (see, e.g., Brown 1952).
Replace (5) in (4) to obtain the partial adjustment labor supply specification as in, for example,
Baltagi et al. (2005):
lnhit = α lnhit−1+β1 lnwit +β2Xit +β3σw,it +µi+ωit . (6)
2For a slightly different derivation that incorporates wage variance into the labor supply equation, see Pistaferri
(2003).
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The parameters of (4) can be recovered following the estimation of (6) with α = 1−θ , β1 =
θβ˜1, β2 = θβ˜2, β3 = θβ˜3, β4 = θβ˜4, µi = θ µ˜i, and ωit = θvit (Baltagi et al. 2005). The partial
adjustment model nests the classic labor supply equation with θ = 1 as a special case. Taking the
first differences of equation (6), we obtain our empirical labor supply equation:
∆ lnhit = α∆ lnhit−1+β1∆ lnwit +β2∆Xit +β3∆σw,it + εit . (7)
In specification (7), the short-run labor supply elasticity is given by SRηw = β1, and the short-
run labor supply elasticity with respect to risk by SRησw = β3. The corresponding long-run elastic-
ities are LRηw = β1/(1−α) and LRησw = β3/(1−α).
3 Empirical Strategy
3.1 Measurement of Wage Risk
We use data from the Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) described in Subsection 3.4 to construct
measures for both gross and marginal net wage risk. We calculate gross wages by dividing gross
labor income by hours of work (see Subsection 3.4 for details). While we focus on net wages,
we show results with gross wages as a robustness test. We calculate marginal net wage rates by







that is, we increase each person’s annual labor income yit marginally.3 We calculate net income
NetInc using the microsimulation model STSM. Jessen et al. (2015) present a comprehensive
overview of marginal tax rates for different households (for more information, see Steiner et al.
(2012)).
To obtain measures of wage risk we detrend, in a first step, log gross wage growth with a
regression on age, its square, education, and interactions of these variables to avoid variations
due to predictable wage growth, following, for instance, Hryshko (2012). In a second step, we
obtain the sample standard deviation of the detrended log wage for each person for rolling sample
windows of the previous 5 years similar to Parker et al. (2005).4 Hence, our risk measure uses only
the variation within individuals. The wage risk measure is given by
3We set ∆yit = 2000 Euro, which implies an increase in labor income of about 40 Euro per week.









(w˜ j− ¯˜w j)2,
where w˜ j denotes the detrended (net or gross) wage. The idea behind this measure is that work-
ers use past variations in idiosyncratic wages to form expectations about future risk. Therefore, we
may treat this measure as exogenous at the moment of the labor supply decision. We denote this
measure by σw,it . For the estimations, we standardize the risk measure by one standard deviation
of the sample used in the regression to facilitate interpretation. We provide robustness tests with
different risk measures, such as without detrending, subjective risk measures, or other household
income risk in the Appendix in Table A5.
We divide our sample into blue collar workers, white collar workers, civil servants, and self-
employed. Since we are mainly interested in decisions during work life at ages where occupational
changes are rare, we leave extending our model to incorporate occupational choice to future re-
search. This does not impair our results because we eliminate person-specific fixed effects and
our risk measure is based on within-variation of wages. Figure 1 shows how the average net wage
risk evolves over the life cycle for each subgroup. Only age-occupation combinations with more
than 15 observations are displayed, thus the trajectory for self-employed starts at age 35. As ex-
pected, the hourly wages of self-employed workers are more volatile over the entire life cycle than
those of employees. Blue and white collar workers have similar levels of wage risks. For most age
groups, the average net wage risk of civil servants is slightly lower than those of blue collar and
white collar workers.
3.2 Measurement of Unemployment Probability
The control variable unemployment probability PrU,it is estimated similarly as in Carroll et al.
(2003). We use a heteroskedastic probit model to estimate the probability of unemployment in
the following year conditional on regressors for occupation, industry, region, education, age, age
squared, age interacted with occupation, and with education, marital status, unemployment expe-
rience, and gender. The vector of regressors of the heteroskedasticity function includes previous
unemployment experience and years of education.
7


















20 30 40 50 60
Age
Blue Collar White Collar
Civil Servants Self−employed
Note: Standard deviation of marginal net wages in past five years for currently working married men.
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Note: Predicted probability of unemployment next year for currently working married men.
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This predicted probability PrU,it is then used as a regressor in our hours of work regressions.5
Note that we exploit the panel structure of the SOEP to estimate the conditional probability of
unemployment in the future rather than simply the unconditional probability of current unem-
ployment. PrU,it can be thought of as a rational expectation of the odds of a currently working
individual not to be working next year.
Figure 2 displays how the average unemployment probability evolves over the life cycle for
the four occupational groups. As in Figure 1, only age-occupation combinations with more than
15 observations are displayed. Civil servants have the lowest average unemployment probability,
followed by white collar workers. For most parts of the life cycle, blue collar workers face the
highest average unemployment probability.
3.3 Instrumentation and Estimation Methods
To estimate equation (7), we need to account for several endogeneity problems. First, the first
difference of the lagged dependent variable is correlated with the error term εit , which includes
shocks from t − 1. We follow Anderson and Hsiao (1981) and solve this problem by applying
the method of instrumental variables, where we use the level lnhit−2 as the excluded instrument
(Anderson-Hsiao estimator). In an alternative specification, we exploit additional moment con-
ditions as suggested by Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) and Arellano and Bond (1991) and apply the
two-step difference GMM estimator (DIFF-GMM) with Windmeijer (2005) finite-sample correc-
tion. Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) show that imposing additional
restrictions on the initial values of the data generating process and using lagged levels and lagged
differences as instruments improves the efficiency of the estimates. We also present the results
from this estimator, called the system GMM (SYS-GMM). Following Roodman (2009), we col-
lapse the matrix of instruments.
5For currently working individual i, we assume a latent variable U∗it = ZUit αU + ζit such that U
∗
it > 0 if the person
will not be working in the following year and U∗it ≤ 0 otherwise. We assume ζit is a normally distributed idiosyncratic
shock that is uncorrelated with ZUit , a row vector of observable characteristics for individual i at time t. Following
Harvey (1976), we allow the variance to vary with independent variables Wit such that σ2it = [exp(WitγU )]2. Therefore,






where Φ() is the cumulative distribution function of a normal random variable. The dependent variable is an indicator
that takes on a value of 1 if individual i works in year t and does not work in year t + 1, and takes on a value of 0 if
individual i works in both periods.
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Second, marginal net wage rates may be endogenous for two reasons: First, measurement
error in hours leads to downward denominator bias in the coefficient of wage rate since the hourly
wage is calculated by dividing labor income by the dependent variable hours of work (cf. Altonji
1986; Keane 2011). Second, the marginal net wage depends on the choice of hours because of the
nonlinear tax and transfer system. Therefore, we instrument marginal net wages with the first lag
of net labor income. This variable is predetermined during the current period labor supply choices
and uncorrelated with the measurement error in current period hours.
3.4 Data
Our study uses data from the SOEP (version 30), a representative annual panel survey in Germany.
Wagner et al. (2007) provide a detailed description of the data. We use observations from 2001-
2012 and focus on men because the extensive margin plays an important role in women’s labor
supply decisions. Extending our model in this direction is an interesting avenue for future research.
The sample is restricted to prime age (older than 25 and younger than 56) married men working
at least 20 hours to allow comparisons with the canonical labor supply literature, for example,
Altonji (1986) and MaCurdy (1981).6 Further, we drop persons who indicated having received
social welfare payments. We restrict our sample to individuals working between 20 and 80 hours
per week. In total, we observe 10,987 data points from 2,488 persons. Table A1 in the Appendix
summarizes the number of observations lost due to each sample selection.
Table 1 provides weighted summary statistics of the most important variables, including wage
risk and unemployment probability measures. In the first row we report the average hours worked
per week, about 42 in our sample. Hourly wages average 23 Euro, with average marginal net wages
of 13 Euro.7 To calculate hours of work and hourly wages, we construct weekly paid hours of
work following Euwals (2005).8 The general aim is to account for differences in compensation for
overtime hours. We use paid hours because an increase in these translates directly into an increase
6Including unmarried men yields very similar results, available upon request.
7Hourly wages are constructed by dividing gross monthly labor incomes by paid hours of work. This and other
monetary variables are converted to 2010 prices using the consumer price index provided by the Federal Statistical
Office. Labor earnings include wages and salaries from all employment including training, self-employment income,
and bonuses, overtime, and profit-sharing.
8Individual i may work according to one of two paid overtime rules orit at time t. This is because the data provides
information only on whether overtime was (a) fully paid, (b) fully compensated with time off, (c) partly paid, partly
compensated with time off, or (d) not compensated at all. I(orit = a) is an indicator function, in this case indicating
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Unit Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N
Labor Supply
Weekly Hours Worked (h) 41.78 6.85 20 80 10,987
Wages and Incomes
Hourly Gross Wage (Euro) 22.62 10.15 2.27 98.06 10,987
Hourly Marginal Net Wage (Euro) 13.07 6.33 1.04 57.67 10,987
Monthly Gross Labor Income (Euro) 3,896.83 1,972.09 319 27,000 10,987
Monthly Net Labor Income (Euro) 2,554.75 1,202.22 150 12,072 10,987
Wage and Unemployment Probability
Gross Wage Risk (ln Euro) 0.192 0.195 0 3.539 10,987
Marginal Net Wage Risk (ln Euro) 0.249 0.224 0 3.354 10,987
Unemployment Probability (%) 1.1 1.7 0 21.7 10,987
Demographics and Characteristics
Age (a) 43.9 7 25 55 10,987
Years of Education (a) 12.9 2.7 7 18 10,987
Work Experience (a) 22.3 7.9 2 41.2 10,987
Children younger than 3 years (%) 9.0 28.6 0 100 10,987
Children between 3 and 6 years (%) 14.2 34.9 0 100 10,987
Children between 7 and 18 years (%) 48.5 50 0 100 10,987
East Germany (%) 14.0 34.7 0 100 10987
Type of Work
Self-Employed (%) 6.5 24.7 0 100 10,987
Blue Collar (%) 32.7 46.9 0 100 10,987
White Collar (%) 48.2 50 0 100 10,987
Civil Servant (%) 12.6 33.1 0 100 10,987
One-Digit International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO)
Managers (%) 10.6 30.8 0 100 10,987
Professionals (%) 21.9 41.3 0 100 10,987
Technicians (%) 21.1 40.8 0 100 10,987
Clerks (%) 7.8 26.7 0 100 10,987
Service and Sales (%) 4.6 20.8 0 100 10,987
Craftsmen (%) 20.3 40.2 0 100 10,987
Operatives (%) 9.7 29.6 0 100 10,987
Unskilled (%) 4.1 19.9 0 100 10,987
Notes: Data from SOEP (version 30). Sample of married prime-age males; 2001-2012.
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in income. Robustness tests using different measures of hours supplied are reported in Table A4.
The last three variables in Table 1 show that our sample has 6.5% self-employed workers, about
32.7% blue collar workers, and about 48% white collar workers. Self-employed workers include
freelance professionals and other self-employed persons. Blue collar workers include untrained
and trained workers. White collar workers are employees with simple tasks, untrained and trained
employees with simple tasks, qualified and highly qualified professionals, and managerial staff.
4 Results
4.1 Impact of Wage Risk on Weekly Hours of Work
Table 2 presents the results of the augmented labor supply equation for different estimators, where
the dependent variable is log paid hours of work.9 Standard errors are robust and clustered at the
individual level. Columns 1 and 2 show the results for the immediate adjustment specification,
column 3 for the specification (3) while columns 4–6 show results for the preferred dynamic spec-
ification (7).10 The first column displays results for the pooled OLS. The coefficient of net wage is
significantly negative, which is not in line with standard theoretical predictions and likely to be a
result of the denominator bias described in Subsection 3.3. The main coefficient of interest is the
one associated with wage risk. The coefficient of 0.021 indicates that an increase in wage risk by
one standard deviation would increase labor supply by 2.1%. The coefficient on unemployment
probability is very small and not statistically significant.
Column 2 shows results for the pooled 2SLS estimator11, where net wage is instrumented with
lagged net labor income to overcome the denominator bias. As expected, the sign of the coefficient
of net wage becomes positive and the coefficient of wage risk remains significantly positive with a
point estimate of 0.028. The unemployment probability becomes significant and the point estimate
of 0.016 implies that an increase in unemployment probability by one standard deviation translates
into 1.6% more hours worked. Column 3 displays the results obtained with the first difference
that overtime rule (a) applies. Therefore, we can approximate paid hours of work as hit = hcit + I(orit = a)(htit −
hcit)+0.5I(orit = c)(htit −hcit), where hcit are contracted hours of work and htit are actual hours of work.
9Table A4 in the Appendix shows the results for alternative definitions of hours of work.
10Table A2 in the Appendix shows the equivalent table using gross wages instead of marginal net wages.
11We estimate it using the ivreg2 package (Baum et al. 2016).
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estimator (FD-IV) with the equivalent instrument for net wages. The wage risk coefficient drops
slightly but remains significantly positive.
The partial adjustment specification results appear in columns 4–6 with the Anderson-Hsiao
estimator displayed in column 4 and the results for the Difference and System GMM estimators12
displayed in columns 5 and 6, respectively. The immediate adjustment specification is rejected
with all three estimators with point estimates of lagged hours of work between 0.12 and 0.16.
For all three dynamic estimators, the coefficients of wage risk and unemployment probability are
statistically significant. The magnitude of these effects is similar across all dynamic specifications
and close to the results of the immediate adjustment specifications. The coefficient of marginal
net wage is significant only for the system GMM estimator, implying a short run elasticity of
SRηw = 0.175 and a long run elasticity of LRηw = 0.20. For the difference and system GMM
estimators, autocorrelation and Hansen tests appear below the estimates. The null hypothesis of no
autocorrelation of second order cannot be rejected and the Hansen overidentification test does not
indicate any invalidity in the instruments.





































































































































































































































4.2 Importance of Precautionary Labor Supply
With our estimates of the wage risk semi-elasticity we can quantify the importance of precau-
tionary labor supply in a ceteris paribus exercise. We use the estimates to simulate the resulting
distribution of hours if all individuals faced the same small wage risk. We construct this simu-
lated counterfactual hˆit from the prediction of equation (7) with minimum sample wage risk σminw,it .
We use the estimates obtained with the System GMM estimator. We then compare actual hours
of work hit observed in the data with their simulated counterfactuals. The difference gives us a
measure of the magnitude of precautionary labor supply and, for the short-run, is calculated as
hˆSR,it−hit =−β3(σw,it−σminw,it ). (8)
Figure 3 shows three points for each individual in the sample in 2011. The first point (pi,hi),
denoted by a small circle, indicates the percentile rank pi of individual i in the actual observed
distribution of hours of work (vertical axis) and hi indicates the actual hours of work (horizontal
axis). The second point (pi, hˆSR,i) keeps the percentile ranking pi from the observed distribution
and indicates the simulated short-run value of the hours of work hˆSR,i when σw,it is set to σminw,it .
The third point (pi, hˆLR,i) shows, as before, pi from the observed distribution and indicates the
simulated long-run value of the hours of work ln hˆLR,i when σw,it is set to σminw,it .13
hˆLR,it−hit =− β31−α (σw,it−σ
min
w,it ). (9)
The short-run simulated hours lie to the left of the actual hours distribution. The horizontal
difference between short-run simulated points and observed points indicates the reduction in the
number of hours in the short run if wage risk were reduced to the minimum level. The long-run
simulated hours lie to the left of both the actual hours distribution and the short-run simulated
points. The horizontal difference between long-run simulated points and observed points indicates
the reduction in the number of hours of work in the long-run if wage risk were reduced to the
13Infinite horizon models with patient consumers, that is, whose time preference rate is equal to or less than the
interest rate, may describe the behavior of dynasties or central planners but are empirically not relevant for individual
consumers because patient consumers accumulate assets indefinitely such that income and thus precautionary labor
supply becomes irrelevant as capital income increasingly finances consumption (Deaton 1991, 1992). Therefore,
consumers must be impatient to desire to borrow. With borrowing constraints, precautionary labor supply may be
empirically relevant. Carroll (1997) shows how infinite-horizon models with relevant precautionary saving behavior
compare to finite-horizon models and outdated certainty equivalence versions where labor supply is exogenous.
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Notes: Small circles indicate the percentile rank of individual i in the actual observed distribution of hours of work
(vertical axis) and the actual hours of work (horizontal axis) in 2011. Triangles maintain the percentile ranking from
the observed distribution and indicate the simulated short-run value of the hours of work when σw,it is set to σminw,it .
Plus symbols denote the respective long-run hours of work when σw,it is set to σminw,it .
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Table 3: Percentage Reduction for Different Occupations
Short-Run Long-Run
Perfect Foresight Civil Servants Perfect Foresight Civil Servants
Self-Employed 4.88 3.57 5.53 4.04
Blue Collar 2.09 0.74 2.38 0.84
White Collar 1.98 0.64 2.26 0.72
Civil Servants 1.92 0.58 2.19 0.65
All 2.19 0.85 2.49 0.96
Notes: Simulated percentage reduction in hours of work when reducing wage risk to the
sample minimum (perfect foresight) or the median risk faced by civil servants.
minimum level. The horizontal difference between simulated points in the long- and short-run
indicates how much of the adjustment in hours would occur as an immediate reaction to the wage
risk reduction.
Table 3 reports the labor supply reduction in the short run (columns 1 and 2) and the long-run
(columns 3 and 4) if wage risk were reduced to the sample minimum (columns 1 and 3) or the
median wage risk of civil servants (columns 2 and 4). Civil servants have a below average wage
risk and are generally regarded as a group with relatively low uncertainty (Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln and
Schu¨ndeln 2005). In our sample, hours of work would reduce by 2.49% in the long run if wage
risk were reduced to the sample minimum. Keep in mind that this is a ceteris paribus exercise
neglecting general equilibrium effects. Defining precautionary labor supply as the difference be-
tween hours worked in the status quo and in the absence of wage risk and given the average of
42 weekly paid hours of work in our sample, precautionary labor supply amounts to 1.05 hours
per week on average. This effect is economically important, particularly for the self-employed, a
group, which faces average wage risks substantially above the sample mean.
If wage risk were reduced instead to the average wage risk of civil servants, labor supply would
decrease on average by 0.96% in the long run. For the self-employed, the long-run labor supply
reduction would still amount to 4%. If the wage risk of all civil servants were reduced to its median,
civil servants’ labor supply would decrease by 0.65%.14
14This effect would equal zero if the distribution of wage risk were symmetric for civil servants.
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4.3 Results by Occupations
The key results in Table 3 differ across occupational groups due to differences in wage risk. To
quantify this heterogeneity across groups, we present the results of our preferred specification
across the groups introduced above and other occupational classifications. Table 4 provides sepa-
rate results for different occupational groups using the system GMM estimator with the same in-
struments as in Table 2.15 As before, the risk measures are normalized by one standard deviation;
however, this time not by the overall, but the sub-sample specific standard deviation. The point es-
timate of the wage risk coefficient is positive and statistically significant for self-employed, white-
collar, and blue-collar workers, but not statistically different from zero for civil servants. The point
estimate is largest for self-employed workers (0.035) and much smaller for white-collar (0.010)
and blue-collar workers (0.007), suggesting the important role of precautionary labor supply for
the self-employed. The coefficient on the lag of paid hours worked is not statistically significant
for the self-employed and civil servants, which makes intuitive sense. These two groups are not as
severely constrained in their hours choices as regular employees. Blue-collar workers (0.228) are
more constrained than white-collar workers (0.123). The coefficient of net wage is positive and
statistically significant for all groups.
The coefficient of net wage, that is, the Frisch elasticity, is positive and significant for all
groups. It is higher for civil servants than for other occupational groups. This makes intuitive
sense, as the Frisch elasticity is given by 1/γ and a large ”risk aversion with respect to leisure”
implies a high Frisch elasticity. Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln and Schu¨ndeln (2005) document self-selection
into public service by individuals with high risk aversion. As in the estimation using the entire
sample, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation of second order. The Hansen
test indicates that the instrument may be invalid only for blue-collar workers.
Table 5 shows system GMM estimates of the dynamic labor supply equation for eight profes-
sions grouped according to the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO 88).
Each one-digit ISCO group is composed of several of the occupational classifications we used
above, that is, some managers are self-employed, some not. The null hypothesis that wage risk
does not affect labor supply is rejected for managers, professionals, technicians, craftsmen, and
operatives. The coefficient of net wage is significantly positive for all but service workers and op-
eratives. Generally, both the coefficients of net wage risk and net wage are of similar magnitude as
15Results obtained using gross wages instead of net wages appear in Table A3 in the Appendix.
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Table 4: System GMM Labor Supply Regressions for Occupational Groups
Self-Employed White Collar Blue Collar Civil Servant
Lag of Hours Worked 0.122 0.123∗∗∗ 0.228∗∗∗ 0.037
(0.099) (0.048) (0.055) (0.130)
Net Wage Risk 0.035∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗ -0.007
(0.012) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007)
Unempl. Prob. -0.012 0.005 0.010∗∗∗ -0.001
(0.014) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Net Wage 0.127∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.020) (0.022) (0.096)
Controls X X X X
Observations 860 5,561 2,927 1,407
AR(1) in FD 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
AR(2) in FD 0.723 0.859 0.478 0.273
Hansen 0.186 0.359 0.024 0.356
Notes: Estimation of equation (7) using the SYS-GMM as in column 6, Table 2.
Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
those obtained in the estimation using the main sample. None of the specification tests rejects the










































































































































































































4.4 Does Precautionary Labor Supply Show Up in Savings?
In this subsection, we test whether our results for precautionary labor supply appear in precau-
tionary saving. Additional hours worked can only be interpreted as precautionary labor supply if
they lead to more savings. Therefore, precautionary savings must be influenced by the measure
of wage risk that also affects labor supply. We test this restriction by regressing log net wealth on
wage risk, unemployment probability, log of disposable household income, and the same control
variables as in Subsection 4.1.16
Table 6 presents estimates obtained using the first-difference estimator (FD) and the fixed ef-
fects estimator (Fixed Effects). The coefficient of wage risk can be interpreted as the percentage
change in net wealth if wage risk increases by one sample standard deviation. The point estimate
suggests that this effect is about 9%. A comparison between actual net wealth and counterfactual
net wealth at minimum wage risk shows that precautionary wealth amounts to 22,216 Euro and
22,312 Euro on average with fixed effects and first differences, respectively. This amount covers
average consumption expenditures for about 9 months. However, the standard errors are too large
to obtain statistical significance.
While our estimates are statistically insignificant, the confidence interval includes findings
from the literature. Guiso et al. (1992) estimate the precautionary component of net wealth at
only 2%. Lusardi (1998) uses net wealth as well and finds precautionary wealth of 1% to 3.5%.
Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln and Schu¨ndeln (2005); Bartzsch (2008); Geyer (2011); Lusardi (1997); Carroll
and Samwick (1998) estimate precautionary savings for German, Italian, and U.S. households to
be in the range of 20-50%.
In our sample, average monthly savings are about 450 Euro. Assuming that 50% of these
savings are due to the precautionary motive implies that overall precautionary savings amount to
225 Euro per month. Table 1 shows that men in our sample work an average of about 42 hours per
week and earn an hourly marginal net wage of about 13 Euro. With our estimate of the share of
precautionary weekly hours of 2.5% (Table 3), precautionary savings due to precautionary labor
supply are 59 Euro per month or 26% of precautionary savings. If only 20% of total savings are
due to precaution, precautionary labor supply amounts to 66% of precautionary savings.
16Net wealth is the sum of housing and other property (minus mortgage debt), financial assets, the cash surrender
value of private life and pension insurance policies, tangible assets, and the net market value of commercial enterprises,
minus debt from consumer credit. In the following, we use the five wealth implicates imputed by the SOEP according
to Rubin’s rule (Little and Rubin 1987; Rubin 1987).
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Table 6: Precautionary Savings with Imputed Net Wealth
FD Fixed Effects
Wage Risk 0.094 0.091
(0.089) (0.091)
Unempl. Prob. 0.438 0.436
(0.281) (0.283)




Notes: Net wealth is observed in survey years 2002, 2007, and
2012. For our sample (see Table A1), the mean over the 5 im-
plications of the weighted mean of this variable is 231,024 2010
Euro, the median is 168,662 2010 Euro, and the standard devia-
tion is 286,840 2010 Euro.
Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
4.5 A Calibration Exercise
The result that 26% of precautionary savings is due to precautionary labor supply is consistent with
a simple simulation exercise of a two-period version of our model in Section 2.17 We set certain
wages in the first period to 13 Euro, the hourly marginal net wage in the sample (Table 1). In the
second period, wage realizations of 8 Euro or 18 Euro are possible with equal probability. We take
the Frisch labor supply elasticity 1/γ from the main results in Subsection 4.1 as 0.20. We calibrate
the coefficient of relative risk aversion ϑ and the parameter b to match the observed mean weekly
hours of work (Table 1). The respective values of the parameters are -1.67, and 2.5× 10−12.18
We restrict the discount rate ρ to one and the interest rate r to zero. Therefore, the precautionary
motive is the only reason to save.
We solve for the optimal solution under both uncertainty and certainty algebraically. Under
certainty, where the second period wage is 13 Euro, the first and second period labor supply are
the same, h1 = h2 = 42.42 hours per week and savings s = 0 Euro. Under uncertainty, the first
period labor supply is h1 = 43.60 weekly hours, the second period labor supply h2 = 41.62 weekly
17We assume that second period labor supply is chosen before wages are known.
18Chetty (2006) shows that commonly estimated labor supply elasticities are in line with ϑ >−2.
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hours, and savings s = 59.11 Euro. The difference in first period labor supply under uncertainty
and certainty gives precautionary labor supply per week. In this simulation, it is 1.19 weekly
hours, which is in line with the results in Section 4.2. With an hourly wage of 13 Euro, the sample
average, this implies that 26.08% of precautionary savings are due to precautionary labor supply.
In this simulation, 73.92% are due to cuts in consumption.
5 Summary and Conclusions
We quantify the importance of wage risk to explain the hours of work of married men. The analy-
sis is based on German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) data for 2001 to 2012. We find that workers
choose slightly more than an hour per week to shield against unpredictable wage shocks. Workers
adjust hours of work with changes in idiosyncratic wage risk. These effects are statistically signif-
icant for various occupations, but not for civil servants, which is in line with previous studies. We
observe the largest absolute and relative effects of wage risk for the self-employed.
Labor supply adjustments to wage risk can only be interpreted as precautionary labor supply
if savings react to wage risk as well. Therefore, we run wealth regressions and replicate results
from the literature on the size of precautionary savings. While the resulting coefficients are not
statistically different from zero, the confidence intervals include results from the literature. As-
suming that about 50% of savings are due to the precautionary motive, we show that about 26% of
precautionary savings are due to precautionary labor supply.
To verify that our estimated results are in line with theoretical predictions, we calibrate a sim-
ple two period model. Using realistic parameters of the utility function, including our estimate of
the Frisch labor supply elasticity, we replicate our empirical finding that about a quarter of precau-
tionary savings are due to precautionary labor supply.
Precautionary labor supply is economically important, particularly for the self-employed, a
group that faces average wage risks substantially above the sample mean. This group works 5.53%
of their hours because of the precautionary motive. If all workers faced the same risk as the median
civil servant, hours worked would decrease on average by 1% in the long run.
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Table A1: Sample Restrictions
Full sample: 416,241 person years Eliminated Remaining
Incomplete interviews 9,829 406,412
Drop if female 207,407 199,005
Drop if not married 55,457 143,548
Drop if younger than 26 or older than 55 in each year 86,223 57,325
Drop if in military or agriculture 2,155 55,170
Drop if transfer recipients 6,806 48,364
Drop if very low hours worked 495 47,869
Drop if unrealistic hours changes 115 47,754
Drop if unrealistic wage changes 670 47,084









































































































































































































































Table A3: Occupational Groups, System GMM, Gross Wages
Self-Employed White Collar Blue Collar Civil Servant
Log of Hours Worked 0.114 0.128∗∗∗ 0.230∗∗∗ 0.028
(0.102) (0.048) (0.054) (0.125)
Gross Wage Risk 0.032∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.005∗ -0.008
(0.013) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007)
Unempl. Prob. -0.012 0.004 0.011∗∗∗ 0.001
(0.015) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Gross Wage 0.132∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗ 0.206∗∗
(0.054) (0.022) (0.028) (0.094)
Controls X X X X
Observations 860 5,561 2,927 1,407
AR(1) in FD 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
AR(2) in FD 0.947 0.488 0.429 0.330
Hansen 0.379 0.180 0.042 0.407
Notes: Estimation of equation (7) using the SYS-GMM as in column 6, Table 2.
Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
31
C Robustness of Results
Table A4 shows our preferred specification (System GMM) for four alternative dependent vari-
ables. Annual hours (column 1) refers to the SOEP-imputed annual hours of work. Weekly hours,
another variable imputed by the SOEP, is the basis for our hours worked definition but without
adjusting for paid overtime. Respondents are asked directly about Contracted hours and Desired
hours. From a theoretical point of view, desired hours should not be constrained by a partial ad-
justment mechanism (cf. Euwals 2005); hence, we specify an immediate adjustment model for this
specification.
Table A4: Alternative Hours Definitions
Annual Hours Weekly Hours Contracted Hours Desired Hours
Lag of Hours 0.117 0.108 0.204∗∗
(0.0756) (0.0697) (0.0806)
Wage Risk 0.0234∗∗∗ 0.0197∗∗∗ -0.00140 -0.0323
(0.00386) (0.00356) (0.00132) (0.0450)
Unempl. Prob. 0.00850∗∗ 0.0123∗∗∗ 0.000458 -0.0563
(0.00389) (0.00364) (0.00182) (0.0350)
Wage 0.217∗∗∗ 0.215∗∗∗ 0.0320∗∗∗ 0.00563
(0.0242) (0.0233) (0.00768) (0.0379)
Controls X X X X
Observations 11,034 10,845 8,739 10,932
AR(1) in FD 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR(2) in FD 0.496 0.135 0.731 0.921
Hansen 0.414 0.481 0.942 0.792
Notes: Estimation of equation (7) using the SYS-GMM as in column 6, Table 2.
Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A5 shows our preferred specification (System GMM), but with four different risk speci-
fications. Column 1 shows the case with constructed risk measures, as before, but omitting the de-
trending of wages. This measure corresponds to the one used by Parker et al. (2005).19 Columns 2
and 3 include indicators of subjective risk preference (Some Worries, Big Worries), column 4 in-
cludes the risk of additional household income as an additional control. This is constructed as for
wage risk, but using net household income minus net labor income of the household head instead
of the household head’s wage.
Table A5: Alternative Risk Definitions
No Detrending Subj. Risk Subj. & Wage Risk Household Risk
Lag of Hours Worked 0.126∗∗∗ 0.202∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.079) (0.062) (0.038)
Net Wage Risk 0.021∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗
(0.003) (0.005) (0.009)
Unempl. Prob. 0.011∗∗∗ 0.006 0.007 0.011∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004)
Net Wage 0.177∗∗∗ 0.228∗∗∗ 0.196∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.040) (0.029) (0.052)
Some Worries 0.227 0.097
(0.209) (0.147)
Big Worries 0.550 0.308
(0.361) (0.260)
Net Household Risk 0.011
(0.056)
Controls X X X X
Observations 10,755 10,736 10,736 10,527
AR(1) in FD 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.000
AR(2) in FD 0.929 0.674 0.505 0.291
Hansen 0.158 0.951 0.443 0.209
Notes: Estimation of equation (7) using the SYS-GMM as in column 6, Table 2.
Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
19Variables used are the same as with detrending.
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D Variable and Symbol Definitions




ln and log natural logarithm
∆ difference between t and t−1
E expectation operator
Φ() is the cumulative distribution function of a normal random variable
hit actual hours of work per week of individual i (alternative definitions in Ta-
ble A4: annual hours, paid hours, contracted hours)
h∗it desired hours of work per week
cit consumption
wgit gross annual incomes from primary and secondary jobs and from self-
employment divided by hours worked in year t
wit net marginal wages calculated using the STSM
w˜ j detrended (net or gross) wage j+ t years ago
rt real interest rate
ait assets in period t
Mit tax liability
nit other income including total individual income from labor earnings, asset
flows, private retirement income, and private transfers
α = 1−θ speed of adjustment
µi individual fixed effects
ρ discount factor
1/γ Frisch labor elasticity
ϑ coefficient of relative risk aversion
bit taste shifter
υit idiosyncratic taste shocks
eit approximation error
σw,it measure for wage risk
Pr u,it measure for unemployment probability
Ξit vector of control variables including year dummies, years of education, indi-
cator of East Germany, number of children under 18 in the household, gender
Ei currently employed individual
U∗it latent variable
ZUit regressors for occupation, industry, region, education, age, age squared, age
interacted with occupation and with education, marital status, unemployment
experience, and gender
Wit regressors of heteroskedasticity function includes previous unemployment ex-
perience and years of education
σ2it variance of probit model
ζit normally distributed idiosyncratic shock
labinit labor income in period t
σminw,it fixed minimum level of wage risk
hˆSR,it short-run predicted hours with fixed minimum level of wage risk
Continued on next page
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Variable Definition
hˆLR,it long-run predicted hours with fixed minimum level of wage risk
pi percentile ranking of individual i in observed distribution of hours
SRηw short-run wage elasticity
SRησw short-run wage risk elasticity
LRηw long-run wage elasticity
LRησw long-run wage risk elasticity
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